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]COMMENTSI
The Lifting of the Trade Embargo Between
the United States and Vietnam: The Loss
of a Potential Bargaining Tool or a Means
of Fostering Cooperation?
I. Introduction
On February 4, 1994, the United States lifted a nineteen-year trade
embargo that had prohibited virtually all trade between the United States
and Vietnam.1  Under this trade embargo, all U.S. citizens and
businesses were barred from exporting or importing any goods from
Vietnam.2 Moreover, such prohibitions extended beyond the United
States to apply to any person or corporation subject to U.S.
jurisdiction,3 including all foreign subsidiaries of U.S. firms and any
other third parties. 4  Although its strict regulations loosened in later
years, the embargo was adamantly enforced until the day it was lifted.5
1. Jim Mann, Retooling Southeast Asia Geopolitical Map: Global Relations: Lifting the
Trade Embargo on Vietnam Gives U.S. New Opportunities in One of the World's Most Dynamic
Regions, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 4, 1994, at A7; Ruth Marcus & Thomas W. Lippman, Clinton Lifts
Vietnam Trade Embargo: President Calls it 'the Best Way'to Ensure Progress on MIA Issue, WASH.
POST, Feb. 4, 1994, at Al. See Foreign Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 500.201 (1983)
(prohibiting transfers of credit and banking transactions between Vietnam and the United States); see
also Export Administration Regulations, 15 C.F.R. § 785.1 (1993) (pertaining to U.S. exports of
technical data to Vietnam). The Trade Embargo between the United States and Vietnam has
effectively barred trade with Vietnam since 1975. See Michael J. Scown, U.S. Embargo Against
Vietnam, 14 E. ASIAN EXECUTIVE REP. 26 (1992); John Boatman, Sanctions Remain on U.S. Trade
With Vietnam, 11 E. ASIAN EXECUTIVE REP. 25 (1989); Sesto E. Vecchi & Michael J. Scown,
Vietnam's Opening Door: U.S. Embargo Shuts Out Only American Firms, 11 E. ASIAN EXECUTIVE
REP. 20 (1989).
2. Foreign Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 500 (1983).
3. Id.
4. Linda Himelstein, Good Morning, Vietnam, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 25, 1991, at 1.
5. See Scown, supra note 1, at 26.
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Prior to February 4, 1994, much debate raged over whether to lift
the trade embargo. Proponents of continued enforcement stressed that
the trade embargo should remain until Vietnam furnished a full or
satisfactory accounting of all American POWs/MIAs.1 In essence, these
advocates claimed that the trade embargo was a bargaining tool by which
the United States could compel Vietnamese cooperation on the
POW/MIA issue,7 as well as in other areas, such as Vietnamese
conformance with humanitarian practices and compliance with the Paris
Peace Agreement regarding Cambodia Additionally, supporters of
maintaining the trade embargo challenged the potential for economic
benefits resulting from investment in Vietnam.
On the other hand, others insisted that the trade embargo between
the two countries was a misnomer.9 That is, the Vietnamese were
already cooperating with the United States to answer all questions
regarding American POWs/MIAs and thus, by barring participation in
the Vietnamese economic expansion, the United States was only injuring
itself."° Indeed, these advocates perceived that lifting the trade embargo
would evidence cooperation between the United States and Vietnam. As
a result, a resolution of the American POW/MIA issue and an
6. Byron Acohido, Veterans, Boeing Spar on Vietnam Relations, Seattle Times, Apr. 17,
1993, at B6. As of 1992, approximately 2,265 Americans were left unaccounted for as a result of
the Vietnam War. Compilation of reports of Allen F. "Gunner" Kent on his trips to Vietnam on
the POW/MIA issue, Junior Vice Commander-in-Chief, Veteran of Foreign Wars of the U.S.
(VFW) (Nov. 8-25, 1992) (on file with the VFW Washington Office) [hereinafter Compilations of
Reports of Allen F. "Gunner" Kent]. Of these 2,265 soldiers, 1,657 were presumed to be in
Vietnam, 519 in Laos, and 81 in Cambodia. Id. See also Roger A. Munson, National Commander,
American Legion, Letter to Editor: Time to Normalize Relations with Vietnam: Hold Out For
P.O.W.s, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 1993, at A12; U.S. Wants More Progress on MIAs Before Ending
Vietnam Embargo, Lord Says, Int'l Trade Daily (BNA) (July 22, 1993); Veterans Groups Urge
Clinton Not to Lift Vietnam Embargo, Int'l Trade Daily (BNA) (Apr. 14, 1993).
7. Acohido, supra note 6, at B6.
8. In 1978, Vietnam invaded Cambodia and established a fabricated Cambodian government
enforced by a Vietnamese military presence. Himelstein, supra note 4, at 1. As Vietnam eventually
withdrew its influence from Cambodia, peace talks involving Cambodia and Vietnam were conducted
in Paris. Id. Adherence to the Paris Peace Agreement, which resulted from these talks, had been
one of the conditions established by the United States that had to be met before the trade embargo
would be lifted. See infra part Ill.
9. Sally Gelston, APCACLobbies in Washington, E. ASIAN EXECUTIVE REP., June 15, 1993,
at 5.
10. Id. at 5. See also Murkowski Offers Legislation to Lift Vietnam Trade Embargo, Int'l Trade
Daily (BNA) (Apr. 5 1993); Steve Burkholder, Falling Into Line; Analysts See 'Domino Effect'
Aiding Vietnam if U.S. Lifts Embargo, DALLAS MORNING NEws, Dec. 7, 1992, at 10; Thomas
Lippman, Vietnam: The Big Buildup Begins: U.S. Firms Get Ready to Act Quickly Once Embargo
is Lifted, WASH. POST, Dec. 6, 1992, at HI (hereinafter The Big Buildup].
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establishment of an acceptable system of humanitarian practices would
follow. '
This Comment attempts to fully evaluate the U.S. trade embargo
between the United States and Vietnam. First, Part II will discuss the
specific regulations imposed under the trade embargo. Part III will then
trace the history of the relations between the United States and Vietnam
from the date the embargo was first imposed until it was lifted. Finally,
Part IV analyzes whether the embargo should have been lifted, while
Part V will document the ramifications of the actual lifting of the
embargo.
II. Background
A. The Trade Embargo's Prohibitions
Imposed after the conclusion of the Vietnam War in 1975, the U.S.
trade embargo was codified under both the Foreign Assets Control
Regulations 2 and the Export Administration Regulations. 3  Such
regulations encompassed a broad range of prohibitions. 4 In particular,
no U.S. goods were allowed to be exported to Vietnam through third
world countries.' 5 This prohibition applied to the export of certain
foreign manufactured goods produced from original U.S. technical
data.'6 The purpose of such a prohibition was to restrict any new
technical information from being introduced into Vietnam.17
Transactions involving transportation or shipping by persons subject to
the jurisdiction of the United States were prohibited as well.' 8 Finally,
financial and commercial dealings, including the transfer of funds, were
also prohibited.' 9 As a result, all Vietnamese assets present in the
11. See Gelston, supra note 9, at A5; The Big Buildup, supra note 10, at HI.
12. 31 C.F.R. § 500 (1993).
13. 15 C.F.R. § 785.1 (1993).
14. See Foreign Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 500; Vietnam's Goal is to Attract
Investment of $20 Billion from Foreigners in a Decade, Int'l. Trade Rep. (BNA) (Apr. 28, 1993)
[hereinafter Vietnam's Goal is to Attract Investment].
15. Foreign Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 500.204 (1993). As of August 1990,
services were included in this export ban because they were considered to fall within the criteria of
goods as property. Vecehi & Scown, supra note 1, at 20.
16. See Export Administration Regulations, 15 C.F.R. § 785.1 (1993). See also Himelstein,
supra note 4, at 1.
17. Vecchi & Scown, supra note 1, at 20.
18. See Foreign Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. 500.204 (1993); Export Administration
Regulations 15 C.F.R. 781.1 (1993).
19. Foreign Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. 500.201 (1993).
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United States when the trade embargo was established were frozen."
Furthermore, while travel to Vietnam was not restricted,2 many
monetary limitations were placed upon U.S. citizens visiting Vietnam.
Only non-commercial material of one hundred dollars or less in value
could have been removed from Vietnam. 2 Additionally, credit and
charge cards could not be used to pay for living expenses or goods, and
American travelers were restricted to spending no more than two
hundred dollars per day.' The U.S. government also forbade direct air
flight from the United States to Vietnam.'
Not all activities between the United States and Vietnam were
prohibited, however. From the beginning of the embargo in 1975 until
the lifting of the embargo in 1994, certain exceptions to the embargo's
prohibitions were recognized. These' exceptions evidenced the
expectation of a future free trade arrangement between the two
countries.25 For example, prior to the Bush Administration, U.S
companies could educate themselves and keep current with the business
climate in Vietnam for future investments.26 However, limitations
imposed upon U.S. companies regulated investment preparations so that
signing contracts or evidencing any other form of intent to conduct
business with Vietnam was not allowed.2
President Bush later amended the trade embargo on December 14,
1992, to allow U.S. companies to sign contracts of intent for commercial
dealings that would be implemented once the embargo was lifted.2"
U.S. businesses could then negotiate terms and conditions of contracts,
produce summaries of business discussions, publish letters of intent, as
well as conduct marketing surveys and feasibility studies.29
20. See id. This freeze resulted in numerous lawsuits brought to try and reach the frozen
assets. See Than v. Blumenthal, 19 I.L.M. 219 (1980) (representing an action of a principal
shareholder of stock in the Vietnamese Dong Phuong Bank who demanded money owed to him by
the U.S. Army).
21. ROBERT J. SUTTER, CONGRESSIONALRESEARCH SERVICE, VIETNAM-U.S.RELATIONS: TiE
DEBATE OVER NORMALIZATION (Library of Congress, 1993). President Carter withdrew the ban
on travel to Vietnam by U.S. citizens in 1977. Id.
22. Foreign Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 500.563 (1993).
23. Id.
24. Id. See also SUTTER, supra note 21, at 3. A few major American airlines did lobby for
the rights to fly directly from the United States to Vietnam and back. Id. American producers of
airplane parts also joined in the lobby efforts. Id.
25. State Department Announces Further Lifting of Blocks to Trade With Vietnam, Int'l. Trade
Daily (BNA) (May 4, 1992).
26. SUTTER, supra note 21, at 4.
27. Foreign Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 500.574 (1993).
28. Id.
29. SUTTER, supra note 21.
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Note that all of these preparatory steps were contingent upon the
overturning of the trade embargo."° Any further steps would have been
illegal unless the Office of Foreign Assets Control [OFAC]3" or the
Department of Commerce gave proper authorization. 2  Excluding
limited case-by-case exceptions, most applications for authorization for
conduct that extended beyond preparatory steps were denied.33 The
only exceptions permitted to the embargo on exports to Vietnam were
sales of informational materials that met "basic human needs. "'
Penalties for violations of these regulations were sent to the U.S.
Treasury Department, which had authority over all financial controls
imposed by the trade embargo.35 In an effort to control the growing
number of claims of violations of the trade embargo, the U.S. Treasury
Department established the Office of Foreign Assets Control [OFAC].36
The Treasury Department, through OFAC, levied strict penalties for
violations of the trade embargo.' These penalties included criminal
fines of up to fifty thousand dollars and prison sentences of up to ten
years.38 Sanctions were applied primarily to officers and directors of
businesses or organizations who knowingly participated in violations of
the trade embargo.39
B. The Trading With The Enemy Act
The trade embargo and its implementing regulations, the Foreign
Assets Control Regulations, and the Export Administration Regulations,
30. Id.
31. The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is a special committee of the United States
Treasury Department which has the authority to deal with violations of financial controls imposed
by the Department of the Treasury, namely violations of the embargo between the United States and
Vietnam. See Boatman, supra note 1, at 25.
32. Vecchi & Scown, supra note 1, at 20.
33. Id. at 21.
34. See U.S.-Viemam Trade Relations, supra note 21. The regulations were amended in May
of 1992 to allow exports which meet "basic human needs." See Foreign Assets Control Regulations,
§ 500.573; Export Administration Regulations 15 C.F.R. § 785.1 (1993). Because this exception
was new and somewhat vague, the bounds of this exception were unclear and the scope of basic
human needs was never established. See id
35. Boatman, supra note 1, at 15. This includes export controls regulating both U.S. citizens
and companies, and third party companies. Id.
36. Id. at 25.
37. Scown, supra note 1, at 26.
38. Id.
39. Id. The Department of Commerce maintains similar authority to order severe penalties for
embargo infractions under the Export Administration Act, 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 2401-2420 (1988).
Id. Criminal fines could have been upwards of fifty thousand dollars, or five times the value of the
export (whichever was less). Id. If the transactions were knowingly conducted, the property
transfers were deemed void. Scown, supra note 1, at 26.
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all derive their authority from the Trading with the Enemy Act of
1917.40 The TWEA was originally enacted in response to the defeat of
Germany after World War I. At that time, the underlying objective of
the TWEA was-to deny Germany economic stability. 1 Since then, the
TWEA has denied economic stability to many other countries labeled as
enemies of the United States. 42
40. 50 U.S.C. App §§ 1-44 (1988). In particular, the Foreign Assets Control Regulations are
authorized by § 5(b) of the TWEA. Section 5(b) of the Act provides:
(b)(1) During the time of war, the President may, through any agency that he may
designate, and under such rules and regulations as he may prescribe, by means of
instructions, licenses or otherwise-
(A) investigate, regulate, or prohibit, any transactions in foreign
exchange, transfers of credit or payments between, by, through, or to any
banking institution, and the importing, exporting, hoarding, melting, or
earmarking of gold or silver coin or bullion, currency or securities, and
(B) investigate, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or
prohibit, any acquisition holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal,
transportation, importation or exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising any
right, power, or privilege with respect to, or transactions involving, any
property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest,
by any person, or with respect to any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States; and any property or interest of any foreign country or national thereof shall vest,
when, as, and upon the terms, directed by the President, in such agency or person as may
be designated from time to time by the President, and upon such terms and conditions
as the President may prescribe such interest or property shall be held, used, administered,
liquidated, sold, or otherwise dealt with in the interest of and for the benefit of the United
States, and such designated agency or person may perform any and all acts incident to
the accomplishment or furtherance of these purposes; and the President shall, in the
manner hereinabove provided, require any person to keep a full record of, and to furnish
under oath, in the form of reports or otherwise, complete information relative to any act
or transaction referred to in this subdivision either before, during, or after the completion
thereof, or relative to any interest in foreign property, or relative to any property in
which any foreign country or any national therof has or has had any interest, or as may
be otherwise necessary to enfore the provisions of this subdivision, and in any case in
which a report could be required, the President may, in the manner hereinabove
provided, require the production, or if necessary to the national security or defense, the
seizure, of any bonds or account, records, contracts, letters, memoranda, or other papers,
in the custody or control of such person.
(2) Any payment, conveyance, transfer, assignment, or delivery of property or
interest therein, made to or for the account of the United States, or as otherwise directed,
pursuant to this subdivision or any rule regulation, instruction, or direction issued
hereunder shall to the extent thereof be a full acquittance and discharge for all pruposes
of the obligation of the person making the same; and no person shall be held liable in any
court for or in respect to anything done or omitted in good faith in connection with the
administration of, or in pursuance of an in reliance on, this subdivision, or any rule,
regulation, instruction, or direction issued hereunder.
50 U.S.C. § 5(b) (1988).
41. Marielise Kelly, Artwork from "Enemy" Nations: Informational Material Under the
Trading With The Enemy Act, A Relic of the Perceived Communist Threat, Cernuda v. Heavey, 720
F. Supp. 1544 (S.D. Fla. 1989)., 14 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 567, 570 (1991).
42. For example, China and Cuba have been named as enemies of the United States in the past,
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Subsequent amendments changed the force of the TWEA,
however. 3 Indeed, as a result of these amendments, the TWEA has
lost the all-encompassing power it once possessed as a tool for denying
economic stability to enemy nations of the United States. For instance,
in 1977, certain amendments established executive limitations on power
so that the President could only impose economic sanctions during times
of war." Despite this amendment, however, sanctions imposed on
Vietnam remained in full force because of the establishmenf of a
grandfather clause. Under this grandfather clause, all regulations
established before the amendment to the TWEA remained in effect.45
Additionally, the TWEA was amended in 1988 to allow the trade of
"informational materials" between all countries."' The U.S. Supreme
Court then further amended the TWEA by holding that the guarantee of
freedom of speech found in the first amendment for the U.S. Constitution
extends to non-verbal communications. 7 A supplemental amendment
surfaced in August 1990 and excluded "services" from the embargo
because they were considered "property."48
C. The Trade Embargo's Termination, Modification, or Repeal
The trade embargo was a powerful and significant controlling
device. In contrast, the steps necessary to terminate, modify, or repeal
the controls of the embargo were simple and uncomplicated.' First,
with regard to termination, the financial controls of the TWEA had to be
renewed annually by the President, or the embargo would have lapsed
and subsequently expired.' Therefore, if the President had not issued
and the United States subsequently imposed trade embargoes on these countries. See, e.g., Cuban
Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 515 (1993).
43. See 50 U.S.C. § 5(b)(1) (1988). See also Kelly, supra note 41, at 570.
44. 50U.S.C. 5(b)(1)(1988). This change resulted from the growing fears of the possibilities
of abuse of power by the President. Kelly, supra note 41, at 570.
45. Kelly, supra note 41, at 570. The grandfather clause allows for all sanctions previously
rendered under the TWEA to stand, regardless of subsequent amendments to the Act. Id.
46. See 50 U.S.C. app 5(b)(4) (1988). The definition of the term "informational materials
has been hotly debated, and the scope of the term is still uncertain. See Cernuda v. Heavey, 720
F. Supp. 1545 (S.D. Fla. 189) (holding that artwork falls within the scope of "informational
materials").
47. See Doran v. Salem, 422 U.S. 922, 932-933 (1975) (discussing nude dance as a protected
form of artistic expression). See also Cernuda v. Heavey, 720 F. Supp 1545 (S.D. Fla. 1989)
(holding that artwork may be traded).
48. Vecchi & Scown, supra note 1, at 22.
49. SUTTER, supra note 21, at 2.
50. Id. On September 13, 1993, President Clinton chose to maintain the trade embargo for
another year. If he had not issued this statement before the end of that day, over a year would have
passed since the trade embargo was last ratified, and the embargo would have automatically been
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a statement maintaining the trade embargo between the United States and
Vietnam within one year of its prior renewal, the trade embargo would
have terminated on its own. 51
The trade embargo could just as easily have been modified as
repealed. The President could have issued an executive order to lift the
prohibitions against Vietnam at any time.52  Additionally, the
Department of Commerce has the authority to change export controls
such as those imposed by the embargo by amending the Export
Administration Act,53 or by repealing the administrative orders that
created the export controls. 5' Finally, Congress could have also
modified the embargo55 through legislation.'
III. A History of Relations Between the United States and Vietnam
A. Early Setbacks Following the End of the Vietnam War in the 1970s
The Vietnam trade embargo had been in effect since the communist
victory over South Vietnam in April of 1975. 57 Earlier, under the Paris
Peace Agreements of 1973,1 the United States agreed to supply
Vietnam with aid for reconstruction once the war ended.59
Pursuant to this agreement, Vietnam pressed the United States for
aid upon termination of the war.' Citing the untruthfulness and unfair
wartime practices of Vietnam,6 then-U.S. President Ford ignored the
lifted. Id.
51. Id.
52. SUTrER, supra note 21, at 3.
53. 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 2401-2420 (1988).
54. Id.
55. Scown, supra note 1, at 26.
56. SUTrER, supra note 21, at 3.
57. Id. The Communist Party, in control of North Vietnam, officially seized South Vietnam
in April of 1975 and established communist rule in one united nation, Vietnam. Id.
58. The United States halted its attack on North Vietnam as a result of the beginning of
negotiations in Paris in March 1968. BACKGROUND NOTES-VIETNAM (U.S. Dep't of State, May
1990). The Paris negotiations moved slowly, however. The United States withdrew from ground
combat by 1971 pursuant to the agreement. Id. Although Hanoi claimed to also be supporting the
peace agreement, supplies were sent illegally into South Vietnam. Id. As a direct result of these
additional supplies, the military holding in South Vietnam collapsed, and Saigon itself fell by April
1975. Id.
59. SurrER, supra note 21, at 1. In an effort to coerce Vietnam to end the war, the United
States promised to supply Vietnam with money for reconstruction of the country once the war ended.
Id. The United States refused to follow through on this promise and until the lifting of the trade
embargo, no reconstruction aid had been given to Vietnam by the United States. Id.
60. Id. at 1.
61. More specifically, the United States was irate at Vietnam for its last military assault on
South Vietnam, which was an outright violation of the Paris Peace Agreement of 1973. Id. at 1-2.
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Paris Peace Agreement and flatly refused to send any aid to Vietnam.62
Moreover, he declared that there would be no trade between the two
countries until Vietnam accounted for all American POWs/MIAs, 3 as
well as clearly stating the Vietnamese position in Southeast Asia.' In
addition, from 1975 until 1976, the United States vetoed Vietnam's
application to the United Nations on three different occasions.65
During the Carter administration in 1977, relations with Vietnam
improved.' On March 2, 1977, the restrictions against trade were
slightly relaxed. Specifically, President Carter withdrew the ban on
travel to Vietnam, and dispatched a commissioner to Vietnam to discuss
relations between the two countries as well as other common interests.67
Further, as a result of these positive steps toward normalization between
the two countries, the United States allowed Vietnam admission into the
United Nations.'
As 1978 approached, however, the promising friendly relations
waned. Vietnam abandoned their new-found cooperation by refusing to
release any further information on American POWs/MIAs until the
United States was forthcoming with the reconstruction aid promised to
them under the 1973 Paris Peace Agreement.' Yet, Congress strongly.
opposed sending any aid to Vietnam, and consequently Vietnam received
no aid.7°
Three subsequent incidents completely demolished all hopes of
normalization at that time. First, prior to 1978, discussions and peace
talks took place between Vietnam and the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations [ASEAN], regarding Vietnam's possible affiliation with
ASEAN.7' Vietnam shocked ASEAN by announcing that it had aligned
62. SUTTER, supra note 21, at 1.
63. Because of the high number of U.S. soldiers declared missing in action after the Vietnam
war, the Ford administration commanded Vietnam to either return U.S. soldiers or to give an
acceptable accounting of their whereabouts. Id. Over 2000 soldiers did not return and were
unaccounted for at the termination of the war. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 5.
66. SUTTER, supra note 21, at 2.
67. Id. at 4. Other common interests included facilitating emigration from Vietnam of relatives
of Vietnamese-Americans, normalizing immigration of Vietnamese into the United States through
the Orderly Departure Program (ODP), resolving issues surrounding Amerasians, and procuring the
release of the Vietnamese that were held in prison camps for aiding the United States during the war.
Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. See supra notes 58, 59 and accompanying text.
70. SUTTER, note 21, at 4.
71. Id. at5.
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itself as an ally of the Soviet Union.72 Consequently, all peace talks
between ASEAN and Vietnam were terminated. Moreover, all peace
talk between the United States and Vietnam ceased as a result of the
latter's alliance with the Soviet Union.
73
In addition, in an effort to "air out its countryside," Vietnam exiled
thousands of Vietnamese citizens that were of Chinese descent.74 This
action was a response to the diminished relations between Vietnam and
China." Finding themselves misplaced and without a country, these
people became refugees throughout Southeast Asia.76
Finally, in 1978, Vietnam invaded Cambodia, deposing the pro-
Chinese regime and establishing their own form of government.77 The
Carter Administration immediately reacted by halting all forms of
normalization with Vietnam, subsequently forming an alliance with
ASEAN.78 The United States labored to send money and aid to the
coalition government in Cambodia. 79 Additionally, the United States
and ASEAN joined together to assist the new Chinese refugees that had
once been Vietnamese citizens.' As a direct result of the Vietnamese
allegiance with the Soviet Union, inhumane treatment of Vietnamese
citizens with Chinese origins, and Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia, all
contacts and progress toward the normalization of relations between the
United States and Vietnam were severed. Relations between the two
countries remained nonexistent for almost a decade.
The tense relations between the two continued as President Reagan
took office in 1980. At that time, President Reagan issued a statement
that announced that no normalization between the United States and
Vietnam would take place until Vietnam met certain prerequisites."
These prerequisites included (1) withdrawing all Vietnamese forces from
Cambodia; (2) helping to establish a peace agreement between Vietnam
and Cambodia; and (3) assisting the United States to establish the fullest
possible accounting of American POWs and MIAs.' Vietnam did not









80. SUTTER, supra note 21, at 5.
81. Id.
82. Id.
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relations between the United States and Vietnam transpired during the
Reagan era.
B. Ongoing Dispute Over POWs/MIAs
One of the most controversial issues surrounding the embargo had
been whether U.S. soldiers were held by Vietnam after the Paris Peace
Agreement of 1973.' Although the Vietnamese assert that they returned
all American POW's during Operation Homecoming,' speculation
exists as to whether the Vietnamese are being completely forthcoming.
Most recently in 1992, Stephen J. Morris, a researcher at Harvard
University, found a document in the Moscow archives for the Central
Committee of the Soviet Communist Party that was allegedly written
during the war by Vietnamese Lieutenant General Tran Van Quang."6
The document, known as the Russian Document, is a six-page report
titled Report of the Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Vietnamese
Peoples Army and dated September 15, 1972,' reads as follows:
The total number of American POW's captured to date on the fronts
of IndoChina, in other words in North Vietnam, South Vietnam,
Laos, and Cambodia totals 1205 people. Of this number, 671 people
were captured in North Vietnam and 143 pilots [were captured] in
South Vietnam ... Officially, until now we published a list of 368
prisoners of war, the remainder we have not revealed. The
government of the USA knows well about this, but doesn't know the
exact number of POW's.8
83. In Paris in 1973, delegates from the United States and Vietnam finally reached certain
agreements regarding wartime conduct and promises to be carried out upon the resolution of the war.
Id. Included in these peace talks was the agreement by Vietnam to return all American POWs to
the United States. Id. Vietnam kept this promise, and under the venture termed "Operation
Homecoming" sent over 2,000 POW soldiers back home to the United States. SUrER, supra note
21, at 6.
84. Id.
85. MARK SAUTER & JIM SANDERS, THE MEN WE LEFT BEHIND: HENRY KISSINGER, THE
POLITICS OF DECEIT, AND THE TRAGIC FATE OF POW'S AFTER THE VIETNAM WAR (National Press
Books, 1993).
86. Samuel Francis, The Tell-Tale Memo on POW's, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 16, 1993, at Fl.
Lieutenant General Tran Van Quang was one of the chief leaders for North Vietnam during the war.
Id. See also Adam Clymer, Soviet File Feeds Debate on POWs, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9. 1993, at A7;
Stephen Engelberg, Old M.LA. Theory is Given a New Life, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 1993, at 20;
Stephen A. Holmes, Envoy says POWEvidence Undermines Old Russian Report, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
21, 1993, at A3: Thomas W. Lippman, POWDocurent Renews Bitter Arguments, WASH. POST,
Apr. 14, 1993, at Al.
87. SAUTER & SANDERS, supra note 85, at 322.
88. Francis, supra note 86, at Fl.
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One year after the supposed drafting of the Russian document, in
1973, all POWs were supposedly returned home after the Paris Peace
Agreement, but only 591 Americans came out of the prisons of
Hanoi. 9 Thus, if this document discovered is authentic and accurate,
then there is a question as to the whereabouts of the 614 American
prisoners that never returned to the United States during Operation
Homecoming.' Moreover, a question also remains as to whether the
United States actually knew of the discrepancy that this document
indicates.
1. Authentic Document or Fabricated-Hoax.-There has been much
debate over the authenticity of the document. Indeed, the government
in Hanoi issued a statement adamantly declaring it as a "clear
fabrication." 1  Similarly, many experts in the United States have
discredited this document.' Still, others have advocated that ihe
document in fact may have been written by General Quang.' -It has
also been suggested that the discrepancy in the number of POWs actually
returned and the number of POWs referred to in the Russian document
may have resulted from the document's inclusion of Asians who worked
with the Americans during the war.'
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. "No Money for Vietnam", DAVs Joseph Andiy Says, NAT'L AMVET, May, 1993, at 3
[hereinafter No Money for Vietnam].
92. For example, H. Bruce Franklin,,& professor of English at Rutgers University, stated that
there are so many inaccuracies within the document that it is impossible to believe its credibility.
Steven A. Holmes, Debate Rises on Hanoi P.O.W. Report, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 1993, at A3
[hereinafter Debate Rises]. Franklin further proclaimed that this document was "a clumsy
fabrication . . . [and] there is just about no fact in the document that correlates with the historical
reality. " Id. Franklin illustrated this point by stressing the known fact that as the war progressed,
a consolidation of Vietnamese prisons took place. Id. The document found by Morris, however,
states that there was an increase of prisons from four to eleven. Id.
93. Zbigniew Brzezinski, National Security advisor to President Jimmy Carter, presented
another explanation for the discrepancy in the number of POWs who actually returned to the United
States and the number cited in the document. Francis, supra note 86, at F2. He contended that the
discrepancy is, in all likelihood, a result of the Vietnamese taking hundreds of American POWs and
shooting them in cold blood. Id. Brzezinski suggested that if this is the true explanation for the
discrepancy, then Vietnam should have been able to give the United States the remains of the
victims. Id. The United States has asked for a full accounting of MIAs, including an accounting
of those that are alive, dead, or whose status is unknown. Id. To date, remains are still being
returned to the United States from Vietnam. Id.
94. Francis, supra note 86, at F2. Senator Robert Smith (D-NH), among many, stressed the
validity of the document. He argued that the statistics show that Asian inclusion as an explanation
is an impossibility. Veterans Groups Urge Clinton Not to Lift Vietnam Embargo, Int'l Trade Daily
(DNA) (Apr. 14, 1993) [hereinafter Veterans Group]. Senator Robert Smith, a veteran himself,
based his candidacy on attaining the resolution of the POW/MIA issue. Id. Smith was one of the
most vocal proponents of maintaining the trade embargo, contending that General Quang is the
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Interestingly enough, the Disabled Veterans organization [DAV]
issued a statement asserting the document's validity." This belief
resulted from the lack of evidence indicating that the document is not
authentic.' Conversely, proponents to lifting the trade embargo
doubted the authenticity of the document because they felt that no
evidence existed to prove its validity.'
Finally, on April 18, 1993, the U.S. press disclosed the existence
of this Soviet document to the American public." Consequently, a
convoy sent to Vietnam led by Army General John Vessey9 highlighted
the Russian document as the focal point of their investigative trip."
Upon his return to the United States, Vessey subsequently released
statements that cast doubt on the validity of the Soviet report.10' The
controversy surrounding the authenticity of the Russian document
subsided because of the lack of any new insight into its validity.
Questions remain as to whether the document is legitimate. Its
legitimacy, in fact, may never be determined.
2. U.S. Government's Alleged Concealment of Evidence of
POWs.-For years, there had been growing controversy surrounding the
handling of the POW/MIA issue by the U.S government, and this
controversy climaxed upon the discovery of the Russian document."
Allegations that the United States placed the POW/MIA issue on the back
burner multiplied because of insinuations in the Russian document.
Specifically, these insinuations suggested that the U.S. government
concealed Vietnamese demands for money in exchange for returning
American POWs." 3 Although the U.S. government was quick to deny
author of the document and that the discrepancy in the number of American POW's represents
American POWs who were never released by Vietnam. Id In support of this theory, Smith further
asserted that "Itihey always call [the Asian and South Vietnamese forces allied to the United States]
puppet forces. Anyone who says that [they are included in the count] is just not familiar with the
Communist documents." Id.
95. No Money For Vietnam, supra note 91, at 3.
96. Id.
97. Debate Rises, supra note 92, at A3.
98. SUTTER, supra note 21.
99. Vessey is a retired Army General who was appointed special POW/MIA emissary.
SAUTER & SANDERS, supra note 85, at 321. Vessey has been acclaimed as an honorable man who
has done everything possible to account for all American POWs/MIAs. Id. at 379.
100. SUTTER, supra note 21.
101. Id. at 10.
102. SAUTER & SANDERS, supra note 85, at 153.
103. SuTrER, supra note 21.
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all claims against it, many believed that the United States actively
withheld information.
Even prior to the Russian Document, under the Bush
Administration, the Senate established a special committee to investigate
the past actions of the U.S. government and to determine whether the
government deliberately suppressed investigation into this issue. 5
However, no evidence of any improper actions by the U.S. government
was ever discovered. 16
Most of the accusations against the U.S. government in this regard
are aimed at the Nixon Administration and in particular, at Henry
Kissinger."° Allegations have asserted that Kissinger entered into an
agreement in 1973 to trade $3.25 billion in ransom money to Vietnam
in exchange for POWs under the false label "reconstruction aid","
and Congress, not knowing that the money was actually ransom money,
refused to pass the aid package. t 9 As a result of Congress' denial of
the package, Kissinger did not follow through in the deal to retrieve
American POWs. "' Kissinger's response to these accusations was as
follows:
There is no excuse, two decades after the fact, for anyone to imply
that the last five Presidents from both parties, their White House
staffs, Secretaries of State and Defense, and career diplomatic and
military services either knowingly or negligently failed to do
everything they could do to recover and identify all of our prisoners
and MIA's. "
In effect, whether the U.S. government was remiss in obtaining a
final accounting of American POWs/MIAs depends upon who is asked.
The U.S. government asserts that it worked diligently to reach a final
accounting for all soldiers deemed POW/MIA, whereas the government
opponents assert that the United States was not completely forthcoming
with all of the information they possessed on this issue. Like the validity
104. SAUTER & SANDERS, supra note 85, at 153.
105. SUTTER, supra note 21. Many discredit this committee, stressing that the committee would
not dare turn against the government for which it is employed. Id.
106. Id.
107. SAUTER & SANDERS, supra note 85, at 79.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. Additionally, these advocates asserted that such policies were followed by the Carter
and Reagan administrations. Simon Beck, Vietnam MM's: Victims of War, Victims of Peace, S.
CHINA MORNING POST, Aug. 29, 1993.
111. SAUTER & SANDERS, supra note 85, at 79.
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of the Russian Document, the true role of the U.S. government may
never be known.
C. Efforts at Normalization during the 1980s and 1990s
During the Bush Administration, Vietnam and Cambodia finally
reached a peace agreement.11 2  Given the peace agreement and
Vietnam's adherence to it, the main goal of the trade embargo between
the United States and Vietnam then became the resolution of the
POW/MIA issue." 3  Consequently, Vietnam soon expressed a
willingness to establish a U.S. office in Hanoi to conduct POW/MIA
investigations and other related affairs. 4  Vietnamese cooperation
resulted in a renewed willingness by the United States to take further
measures towards normalizing relations between the two countries. 15
' As such, in April 1991, President Bush outlined a four-phase agenda
that would lead toward normalization between the United States and
Vietnam. 6 These four phases, titled the Roadmap, set forth specific
goals that both the United States and Vietnam had to fulfill before the
trade embargo would be lifted." 7 The Roadmap, specifically the
American and Vietnamese fulfillment of the objectives set forth in the
Roadmap, played an extremely important role in the course of the lifting
of the trade embargo."' 8
1. Phase One.-Phase One of the Roadmap began with the signing
of the peace agreement between Vietnam and Cambodia on October 23,
1991."9 Under Phase One, Vietnam was to sign the Cambodian peace
accord and was to settle all American POW/MIA cases, specifically the
"last known alive" discrepancy cases' and live-sighting reports.
2 1
Additionally, all American remains were to be returned, and Vietnam
112. SUTTER, supra note 21.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 3. In return for cooperation by Vietnam, the United States sent one million dollars
in humanitarian aid to Vietnam. Id. This aid was used mostly to purchase prosthetics for orphans
and children. Id.
115. SUTTER, supra note 21, at 3.
116. Id.
117. 'Id. See infra notes 119-180 and accompanying text.
118. SUTTER, supra note 21, at 3.
119. RAYMOND J. AHEARN & ROBERT J. SITTER, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE,
VIETNAM-U.S. NORMALIZATION: CONSIDERATIONS FOR 1993 16 (Library of Congress, 1993).
120. Id. The "last known alive" discrepancy cases are those cases in which the soldier in
question was last seen alive, either by being taken as a POW, or in another context. Id. Although
they were last believed to be alive, POWs were neither returned home under Operation Homecoming
nor accounted for in any other way. Id.
121. AHEARN & SUTTER, supra note 119, at 16.
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was to implement the Orderly Departure Program (ODP).11 Under the
ODP, Vietnam was to allow all U.S. prisoners and all prisoners of U.S.
allies detained in Vietnam to return to their respective homes."' In
return, the United States was to lift the twenty-five mile ban in New
York which, in effect, barred all Vietnamese diplomats from entering
New York. 24 After completion of these preliminary steps, talks on
normalization were to begin and the United States was to permit U.S.
citizens to travel to Vietnam." Also, the United States was to
publicize concerns regarding genocide in Cambodia and liberalize U.S.
economic relations with Cambodia. 26 All conditions of Phase One
were met by both the United States and Vietnam. 27
2. Phase'Two.-Upon the satisfaction of Phase One and the
installation of U.N. peacekeepers in Cambodia, Phase Two of the
Roadmap commenced in the early 1980s.11 Directed by Phase Two,
Vietnam continued to support the Paris Peace Agreement, and continued
advancing toward a resolution of the POW/MIA issue. 29 In return,
the United States established telecommunications with Vietnam."
Additionally, in the expectation of the lifting of the trade embargo, a
limited signing of contracts by non-governmental organizations was
permitted. 3' Finally, all commercial transactions with Vietnam that
met basic human needs were also approved by the U.S. State
Department. 3 2
During Phase Two, Vietnam appeared to be particularly cooperative
when it assisted the United States in an active pursuit of the "live
sighting reports" in 1992. The United States then reciprocated by
sending three million dollars to Vietnam for humanitarian aid.'33 In
addition, on April 13, 1992, the United States permitted the restoration










131. AHEARN & SUtrER, supra note 119, at 16.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 3. Once again, this aid was generally for prosthetics and aid to abandoned children
and orphans. Id.
134. Id. at 11. Contracts that were developed during this time have since taken effect after the
lifting of the trade embargo. AHEARN & SUTTER, supra note 119, at 11.
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December 14, 1992, the Bush Administration lifted restrictions barring
non-governmental organizations from establishing contracts.135
Given the significant concessions from both sides in 1992, Phase
Two was successfully completed, and the United States sent a high-level
delegation to Hanoi to address the possibilities of completely normalizing
relations between the two countries.136 At that time, the delegation
focused on eliminating the U.S. barriers that prohibited the International
Financing Institutions [IFI] from giving any assistance to Vietnam. 37
The delegation also wanted to allow U.S. firms to open commercial
offices in Vietnam. 3 '
3. Phase Three.-The third phase of the Roadmap began once the
U.N. procedures and the Cambodian settlement process became
settled.'39  Under Phase Three, the responsibilities and duties of
Vietnam were not significantly changed. Vietnam was required to
remove all troops from Cambodia while still upholding the Paris Peace
Agreement."4 In addition, good faith efforts to resolve all discrepancy
cases and to return the remains of all U.S. POWs/MIAs continued.
141
Phase three extended into the Clinton Administration, which
endorsed the four stage Roadmap introduced by the Bush
Administration.142 Nevertheless, the United States entered the third
phase with trepidation. Under Phase Three, the United States was
permitted to open a diplomatic liaison office in Hanoi, and was to allow
Vietnam to establish an office in Washington. 143  Vietnam extended
such an invitation to the United States, and Clinton sent three
permanently stationed delegates to Vietnam.'" However, the United
States failed to reciprocate in extending such an invitation to
Vietnam. 45
Phase Three also called for U.S. permission to allow the
International Monetary Fund/World Bank (IMF) to offer financial
135. Id. at 10.
136. Id. at 9.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. AHEARN & SU'rER, supra note 119, at 16. See also supra notes 119-138 and
accompanying text.
140. AHEARN & SUTrER, supra note 119, at 16.
141. Id.
142. SUTrER, supra note 21, at 5. The Clinton administration undertook a high-level review
of existing policy options in dealing with Vietnam. AHEARN & SuTrrER, supra note 119, at 1.
143. AHEARN & SUTrER, supra note 119, at 16:
144. Id.
145. Id.
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assistance to meet basic human needs to Vietnam. 146 Given Vietnam's
cooperation and the cost of political pressure in trying to persuade France
and Japan to oppose aid to Vietnam, U.S. resistance to funding to
Vietnam was no longer feasible. 47 In addition, many businesses urged
President Clinton to allow IMF lending to Vietnam, declaring that aid to
Vietnam would "further improve [the United States'] ability to resolve
the MIA issue, support human rights, allow U.S. business to compete in
Vietnam, and facilitate our humanitarian work in Vietnam." 48 In
particular, it was believed that once lending reached Vietnam, projects
to build roads, ports, and health care facilities as well as to improve
education could begin. This, in turn was to provide many favorable
results, including: (1) the creation of a more humanitarian relationship
between the two countries; (2) the furtherance of work resolving
POW/MIA issues, since funding could be allocated to make remote areas
in Vietnam more accessible; and (3) the establishment of another area for
foreign investment.'49
Despite these benefits, however, most Veteran groups strongly
urged Clinton to resist allowing Vietnam access to the IMF."5
Primarily, veteran resistance to IMF lending stemmed from the perceived
lack of progress by Vietnam to resolve the POW/MIA issue.' 5' In
fact, Clinton described the progress of Vietnam regarding the POW/MIA
issue as "simply not sufficient to warrant any change in our trade
embargo or any further steps toward normalization."152
146. AHEARN & SUTTER, supra note 119, it 13. The IMF makes loans at low interest rates that
are subsidized by the governments that, fund the agency, and the United States is the largest
shareholder in the IMF. Decision on Vietnam Relations Due Soon, Secretary Christopher Says, Int'l
Trade Daily, (BNA) (June 23, 1993) [hereinafter Decisions on Vietnam]. Therefore, although the
United States does not possess veto power, it does have the authority to prevent lending to certain
countries if it can persuade other major shareholders to support such a position. Id. The blocked
lending to Vietnam from 1975 until September 1993, when Clinton moved to allow IMF assistance
to Vietnam, illustrates this authority. Id. However, with the then-expressed desires of France and
Japan to allow lending to Vietnam, it is debatable whether the United States would have been able
to continue to successfully block lending to Vietnam. Id.
147. AHEARN & SUTTER, supra note 119, at 14.
148. Decisions on Vietnam, supra note 146.
149. Id. Consequently, by allowing aid to flow to Vietnam through the IMF, President Clinton
has effectively established a better mechanism for handling humanitarian concerns. More food,
better shelters, and overall better living conditions will be more available to the Vietnamese. Id.
150. Senator Smith (D-NH) led this opposition. He advocated maintaining the embargo as
leverage until all soldiers have been accounted for and contended that any easing of the trade
embargo, including allowing Vietnam access to IMF, would be lost leverage to the United States.
Veteran Groups, supra note 94.
151. Id.
152. Clinton Open to IMF Loans to Vietnam, Will Not End Trade Embargo or Normalize, Int'l.
Trade Daily (BNA) (July 7, 1993). Note that at that time, Hanoi had not accounted for more than
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Thus, Clinton outlined four key areas in which Vietnam had to
improve efforts before the embargo would be lifted and before
normalization under the Roadmap would continue to Phase Four. 53
First, the remains of all Americans were to be returned, and Vietnam
must have established some concrete results of their efforts to recover
these remains." Second, there was to be a resolution of the remaining
ninety-two discrepancy cases, live sightings, and field activities.
155
Additionally, further assistance from Vietnam toward an investigation for
POW/MIA records in Laos was to be established." 5  Finally, there
must have been greater efforts to provide all POW/MIA records from
their archives so as to reach complete answers.157 Until there was
visible progress in each of these four areas, however, no further steps
towards normalization would be taken.'
Eventually, Clinton lifted the embargo on February 4, 1994, as a
part of Phase Three.'59 However, prior to the lifting of the embargo,
Clinton sent many high-level delegations to Hanoi and to other sections
of Vietnam to investigate the POW/MIA situation as well as to push for
further progress on this situation.1" In March 1993, a Senate Select
Committee consisting of various Senators and Representatives travelled
1600 missing Americans. George Gedda, Clinton Grants U.S. Firms a Limited Role in Vietnam,
REG. CITIZEN, Sep 14, 1993, at 3. Proponents of maintaining the trade embargo advocated
preserving the embargo until a full accounting of all MIAs was given by Vietnam. How Vietnam
could have gone about such a task was not suggested, however. Id.
Moreover, the list of 1600 soldiers still considered missing may not have been accurate.
Under those guidelines, unless a live body or identifiable remains are recovered, the person remains
on this list. Allen F. "Gunner" Kent, On His Trips to Vietnam on the POWMIA Issue, VFW REP.,
Dec. 2, 1992, at 11. Thus, without a body or identifiable remains to show the United States, it may
have been impossible for Hanoi to cooperate under those guidelines. Id.
153. President's Statement RE: U.S. Policy Toward Vietnam, 4 DEP'T ST. BuLL. 499, 500
(1993) [hereinafter President's Statement].
154. Id. at 500.
155. Id. The discrepancy cases refer to those cases that exist if the Russian Document is
authentic. See supra notes 91-101 and accompanying text.
156. President's Statement, supra note 153, at 500. Many American POWs/MIAs are believed
to have disappeared in Laos and Cambodia as well as in Vietnam. Id.
157. Id. All of Vietnam's files from the war were closed to U.S. research until 1988. James
J. Kenney, A Time for Progress.. And Patience, NAT'L AMVET, Summer 1993, at 8. Therefore,
the U.S. must be patient because the slow production of information is the result of the beginning
of production rather than the result of disinterest. Id.
158. SuTTER, supra note 21, at 5.
159. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. See also AHEARN & SUTTER, supra note 119,
at 16.
160. SUTTER, supra note 21, at 5. Since the late 1980s, many groups have been sent to Vietnam
to investigate the POW/MIA issue. Id. Presently, over 200 investigations of live-sighting reports
alone have been conducted. Id.
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together to Vietnam.161 Identified as the Congressional Delegation
(CODEL), representatives from each of the five main veteran
organizations received invitations to join in this trip.1 2 Specifically,
representatives from Vietnam Veterans of America (AMVETS), and the
Veterans of Foreign Wars accepted this invitation. 63 After visiting
Vietnam, CODEL determined overall that it was time for normalization
between the United States and Vietnam, given that a full accounting of
all bodies from the war would be impossible."6
4. Phase Four.-Vietnam and the United States are currently in
Phase Four, which commenced on February 3, 1994, when President
Clinton lifted the trade embargo between the United States and Vietnam.
Clinton indicated that he lifted the embargo as a result of Vietnam's
cooperation in trying to make a full accounting for all American
POWs/MIAs, emphasizing that the ensuing economic benefits were not
a consideration in this decision. 65 Such a clarification should have
come as no surprise, for additional pressures were placed on President
Clinton because many people observed the lifting of the trade embargo
as an either pro-POW/MIA or pro-business issue."
Under Phase Four, the United Nations is to certify free-elections in
Cambodia and a new constitution is to be transcribed by a newly-formed
Cambodian National Assembly. 67 The POW/MIA issue supposedly
resolved, the United States is to establish ambassadorial-level relations
with Vietnam and consider granting "most favored nation" status to the
161. Kenney, supra note 157, at 8.
162. Id. at 8. Senator John Kerry (D-MA) extended these invitations to the five veterans service
organizations so that they could participate in the evaluation of the progress being made by the
Vietnamese government in resolving the POW/MIA issue. Id. The trip was to be made on Memorial
Day. Id. Kerry is the former chairman of the Senate Select Committee for POW/MIA affairs. Id.
163. Kenney, supra note 157, at 8. The CODEL consisted of Senator Kerry, General Needham,
Al Kent of the VFW, Danny Devine of AMVETS', Senator McCain (R-AZ), Representative Lane
Evans (D-IL), and Senator John Glenn (D-OH). Id.
164. Id.
165. CLINTON LiFrs VIETNAM EMBARGO; EMPHASIZES FURTHER POW/MIA ACCOUNTING,
BUREAU OF NAT'L AFFAIRS, DAILY REP. FOR EXECUTIVES, Feb. 4, 1994, at A23 [hereinafter
CLINTON LIFTs VIETNAM EMBARGO].
166. As a result of the lifting of the trade embargo, Clinton has set a precedent for other such
situations in which moral principles may be placed against corporate interests. Murkowski Offers
Legislation to Lift Vietnam Trade Embargo, Int'l Trade Daily, (BNA) (Apr. 5, 1993) [hereinafter
Murkowski Offers Legislation]. Moreover, pressure on Clinton was intensified due to his past
unstable history with the armed services resulting from his dodging of the Vietnam draft. Take the
Plunge: Time to End Vietnam Embargo, REG. CITIZEN, Sep. 18, 1993, at 14 [hereinafter Take the
Plunge].
167. Take the Plunge, supra note 166, at 17.
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Vietnamese for trade purposes. I' Assistance through IMF for non-
basic needs as well as for basic needs is also to be considered." As
long as Vietnam remains helpful in all relations with the United States at
this stage, no additional requirements are to be met. 170
Note that the lifting of the trade embargo has not established
normalized relations between the United States and Vietnam, and Clinton
has stated that Vietnam must show "more progress, more cooperation,
and more answers" regarding the POW/MIA issue before relations will
be completely normalized. 7' Presently, there still exists numerous
restrictions in the area of commercial investment. First, an investment
cannot take place without a government license."r In addition, most
foreign investments require that a partnership be formed with a local
Vietnamese partner who is required to consent to all significant decisions
in the venture.' 7  Furthermore, because Vietnam is still under a
socialist rule where all real property is considered to be owned by the
state, secured lending in Vietnam is virtually nonexistent because banks
are wary of lending money where they cannot take a mortgage on real
property.174  Most significant, however, is the dearth of a legal course
of action should something go awry with any investment. "
It is true that beyond commercial investigation, most of the main
restrictions of the embargo have been eliminated. However, some export
controls, such as those on national security-related exports of U.S. origin
goods and technology, remain in effect. 176 In addition, property and
assets that were frozen under the TWEA at the time the trade embargo
was imposed remain frozen.1" By maintaining this freeze on certain
properties, U.S. officials hope to be able to bargain with Vietnam for the
return of assets from one country to another."
It is important for all foreign investors to be cautious before
committing to any investments in Vietnam. First, because the laws are
168. Id. at 17. This goal of granting "most favored nation" status to Vietnam is the best
possible scenario available.
169. AHEARN & SUTTER supra note 119, at 17.
170. Id.
171. CUNTON LIFrs VIETNAM EMBARGO, supra note 165, at A23.
172. Jonathan L. Golin, Tiger By The Tail, ABA JOURNAL, Feb 1994, at 63, 65. The process




176. Mark Bravin, RISKS, REWARDS IN VIETNAM TRADING; END OF 19-YEAR-OLD EMBARGO
PRESENTS NEw OPPORTUNITIES April 25, 1994, at S6.
177. CLINTON LiFrs VIETNAM EMBARGO, supra note 165.
178. Id.
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quickly changing, it is wise to ascertain the current status of these laws
before committing to them. In addition, many of the new laws have yet
to be implemented.'79 Therefore, the exact application of these laws
is unknown. It has been predicted that a full process of normalization is
years away." Nonetheless, the lifting of the trade embargo is the first
major step in the process to the normalization of relations between the
two countries.
IV. Considerations in the Lifting of the Trade Embargo
The controversy surrounding the lifting of the trade embargo had
been presented as a situation in which moral principles were placed
against corporate interests.' U.S. business placed great pressure on
the United States to lift the trade embargo so that they could compete in
the Vietnamese market, while supporters of maintaining the trade
embargo responded by presenting the morality of using the embargo as
leverage both to obtain an accounting of the POWs/MIAs and to instigate
Vietnam to curb its human rights abuses."8
A. The POW/MIA Issue
Advocates for maintaining the embargo between the United States
and Vietnam firmly believed that if the embargo was lifted, the results
would have been detrimental to the interests of the United States.
1 83
Their first contention was that without the trade embargo, Vietnam
would not comply with any U.S. demands, especially those surrounding
the POW/MIA issue."sa These advocates claimed that Vietnam had a
history of untruthfulness and that any cooperation by the Vietnamese in
the past had been a direct result of the trade embargo.185 That is,
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Acohido, supra note 6, at B6. Senator Frank Murkowski (R-Alaska) declared that "Iw lhen
dealing form isolation, we achieved nothing . . . [wlhen dealing directly we saw progress."
Murkowski Offers Legislation, supra note 166.
182. Murkowski Offers Legislation, supra note 116. James Brazee, president of the Vietnam
Veterans of America, proclaims that "what this has come down to is a choice of economic interest
over human lives and suffering . . . [and that] principles of morality should be placed ahead of
anybody's economic interests." Id.
183. SAUTER & SANDERS, supra note 85.
184. SUTTER, supra note 21, at 8. See also Munson, supra note 6, at A12; U.S. Wants More
Progress on MIAs Before Ending Vietnam Embargo, Lord Says, supra note 6; Veterans Groups Urge
Clinton Not to Lift Vietnam Embargo, supra note 6.
185. SUTTER, supra note 21, at 8. Doubts of the trustworthiness of the Vietnamese stem from
the antics of North Vietnam during the war. Specifically, they broke the Paris Peace Agreement of
1973 by sending supplies illegally into South Vietnam. BACKGROUND NOTES - VIETNAM, supra
note 58. As a direct result of these extra supplies, North Vietnam was able to bring the collapse of
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Vietnam would be apathetic to the POW/MIA issue without the trade
embargo as an incentive for cooperation.
18 6
Ironically, this assumption is untrue. To the contrary, the
Vietnamese worked with the United States in all areas requested under
the Roadmap so as to lift the embargo."8 If subsequent opposition had
been rendered by Vietnam in any of these areas, the United States had
the power to reinstate restrictions on trade between the two
countries. "' Therefore, because Vietnam was quite aware of the
possibility of restrictions being reinstated, future uncooperative action
was, and still is, highly unlikely.
Nonetheless, supporters of the trade embargo still insisted that the
embargo should be maintained until a full accounting of all POW/MIAs
was reached.' 89 In essence, these advocates maintained that even in
light of the trade embargo, Vietnam had not been completely
forthcoming with their aid in this matter."9  As such, advocates not
only were asserting that Vietnam failed to cooperate in providing a full
accounting of U.S. POW/MIAs, but were insinuating that they flatly did
not trust Vietnam.191
Contrary to this conjecture, one of the principal reasons for lifting
the trade embargo was the exceptional cooperation that Vietnam showed
in trying to satisfy all demands placed upon them by the United
States."g For example, Vietnam adhered to the Paris Peace Agreement
by withdrawing all troops from Cambodia and it consciously attempted
to resolve all POW/MIA cases.' Furthermore, immediately prior to
the lifting of the trade embargo, Major General Needham, the U.S.
Saigon. Id. See also SUtrTER, supra note 21.
186. SUTTER, supra note 21.
187. See supra notes 112-180 and accompanying text.
188. See id.
189. Roger A Munson, Time to Normalize Relations With Vietnam, Hold Out For POW's, N.Y.
TIMES, July 9, 1993, at A6 [hereinafter Time to Normalize Relations]. As stated by Roger Munson.
the National Commander of the American Legion, "To accept anything less [than U.S. prisoners or
their remains] is to perpetuate the agony Americans have endured for more than two decades." Id.
See also Munson, supra note 6, at A12; U.S. Wants More Progress on MIAs Before Ending
Embargo, Lord says, supra note 6; Vietnam Groups Urge Clinton Not to Lift Vietnam Embargo,
supra note 6.
190. Time to Normalize Relations, supra note 189, at A6. According to the proponents of this
viewpoint, Vietnam has released less than 1 % of the relevant information available to them. Id.
191. Acohido, supra note 6, at A20. The distrust of Vietnam stems from the activities of
Vietnam during wartime. See supra note 58 and accompanying text. Indeed, supporters of the trade
embargo declared that Vietnam is a "mendacious tyranny." Francis, supra note 86, at Fl.
192. Compilations of Reports of Allen F. "Gunner" Kent, supra note 6, at 2.
193. All of Vietnam's files relating to the war were closed to U.S. researchers until 1988.
Kenney, supra note 157. Vessey feels that they are doing their best, and that the United States
needs to be patient. Id.
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Commander of the Joint Task Force-Full Accounting (JTF-FA),"
stated that Vietnamese cooperation was at its peak.195  All live-sighting
investigations were completed" and no reports showed live
Americans." Additionally, U.S. investigators could travel any place
in Vietnam where they suspected they might find POW/MIA evidence or
remains." The only areas off limits were certain government and
military bases because of the Vietnamese distrust of the intentions of the
United States." Finally, the Vietnamese government gave the United
States free reign over the war museum archives in Hanoi, which signaled
an involvement by the Vietnamese Army to try and finally resolve this
issue.200
Still, embargo supporters insisted that if a full accounting could not
be had, then at least "sufficient steps" toward a full accounting should
be completed before the lifting of the trade embargo. 2°1 Thus, Vietnam
opened the countryside to Americans in search of POWs/MIAs,'
participated in joint task forces formed to uncover answers, 2W gave
most of its records from the war to the United States,' and allowed
the stationing of U.S. diplomats in Hanoi. All of these endeavors were
to better accommodate Americans in search of "the truth".'
Despite all efforts taken by Vietnam to resolve this matter,
supporters of the embargo remained steadfast in their position that a full
194. The JTF-FA, formed in February of 1992, is a command within the Department of Defense
that deals exclusively with American POW/MIA issues. Compilations of Reports of Allen F.
"Gunner" Kent, supra note 6, at 4. The JTF-FA succeeded the Joint Casualty Resolution Center
(JCRC) and is based in Hawaii. Id. The JTF-FA is composed of almost all active duty military
personnel, with a few exceptions for those who also possess needed skills-anthropologists, for
example. Id. The JTF-FA has four detached locations whose commanders report directly to
General Needham in the cities of Bangkok, Hanoi, Vientiane, and Phrom Penh. Id.
A smaller unit named the "Stoney Beach Mission" is also located in the U.S. Embassy in
Bangkok. Id. Currently consisting of five members, this unit collects information on live-sighting
of Americans in communist countries throughout Southeast Asia. Compilations of Reports of Allen
F. "Gunner" Kent, supra note 6, at 5. Specifically, this mission is "to conduct live sightings and
last known alive investigations, refugee and displaced person debriefings, orderly departure program
screening/debriefing and to conduct other miscellaneous POW/MIA investigations." Id.
195. Id. at 2.
196. Id.
197. Kenney, supra note 157.
198. Id. at 2.
199. Compilations of Reports of Allen F. "Gunner" Kent, supra note 6, at 7.
200. Id. at 10.
201. Time to Normalize Relations, supra note 189, at A6.
202. SUrER, supra note 21.
203. Compilations of Reports of Allen F. "Gunner" Kent, supra note 6, at 4.
204. SuTTER, supra note 21.
205. U.S. To Station Envoys in Hanoi As MI Liaisons, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 1993, at B6.
TRADE EMBARGO BETWEEN THE U.S. AND VIETNAM
accounting of all POW/MIAs had to be established before the lifting of
the embargo." However, it is inappropriate to assume that Vietnam,
in a good faith effort, would ever have been able to meet such
outrageous demands. The fact of the matter is that the war was long,
chaotic, and decentralized in command. Thus, the Vietnamese are
equally as unsure as the United States about what actually transpired in
many circumstances. 2' Also, many records were lost or never existed
in the first place.2' Moreover, no systematic recordkeeping existed in
South Vietnam until the war was more than half over. 29 As such, by
maintaining the embargo, the United States seemed to be sending the
message that normalization simply was not attainable.2 °
B. Human Rights Abuses
Supporters of the trade embargo also purported that the trade
embargo should remain until Vietnam changes its position on human
rights issues.2 The repressive stand taken by Vietnam regarding
human rights had been extensively criticized, as Vietnamese human rights
abuses encompassed such areas as freedom of speech, press, assembly
association, workers rights, and the ability to change the
government.212 Until these human rights violations ceased, many
individuals believed that the embargo should have remained. 23  From
206. General John Vessey stated that Vietnam had been bending over backwards to assist the
United States in resolving the POW/MIA issue, but that only the facts will show if the cooperation
was real. Stephen A. Holmes, Envoy Says POW Evidence Undermines Old Russian Report, N.Y.
TeMEs, Apr. 22, 1993, at A3. Once again, the efforts by Vietnam are judged by what they uncover
rather than what they do to uncover it. Id. See also Acohido, supra note 6.
207. Douglas Pike, Creeping Toward Relations in Southeast Asia, Legal l1mes, Jan. 20, 1992,
at 26.
208. Id.
209. Id. As stated by assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Winston
Lord: "I don't think any reasonable person could expect to have every last person accounted for
before taking further steps [to normalize relations with Vietnam]." U.S. Wants More Progress on
MIA's Before Ending Vietnam Embargo, Lord Says, supra note 6.
210. One of the main goals of the embargo was to achieve the fullest possible accounting of
American POWs/MIAs. The present Vietnamese government is highly nationalistic and wary of
compromise resulting from outside pressures. SUTTER, supra note 21, at 7. In light of this fact,
the Asia-Pacific Council of American Chambers (APCAC) advised that the lifting of the embargo
.could enhance progress in accounting for the soldiers MIA and POW." Gelston, supra note 9, at
5.
211. Acohido, supra note 6, at B6.
212. AHEARN & SuTrER, supra note 119, at 6. For example, freedom of religion has been
repressed in Vietnam, but the Vietnamese government has been working to change this so as to
accommodate foreign interests. Id. Also, no other support but that for the communist party is
tolerated. Id.
213. Id.
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this point of view, lifting the trade embargo would send the message of
U.S. approval to the actions of Vietnam.
Such an argument is inapposite, however. The Vietnamese were
and still are aware of the position taken by the United States, and are not
likely to forget this stand simply because the trade embargo has been
lifted. More important, now that the trade embargo is lifted, the United
States may participate in transforming Vietnam into a country that better
respects human rights.
C. Lost Leverage
Ross Perot, a 1992 Presidential candidate, was one of the strongest
advocates for maintaining the trade embargo.21  Specifically, he
asserted that by lifting the trade embargo all leverage possessed by the
United States over Vietnam would be lost21 and consequently the
United States would not have the ability to reach a resolution of the
POW/MIA issue.216 Perot further contended that the United States
would be sending a message of condoning Vietnamese actions if the
embargo was lifted.217 Additionally, he expressed fears that Vietnam
would use this lost leverage against the United States. 8 For example,
Vietnam could demand the reconstruction aid promised by the United
States under the Paris Peace Agreement of 1973 in exchange for their
supplying information regarding American POW/MIAs .29
Whether the trade embargo brandished a bargaining tool for the
United States against Vietnam is questionable. For example, nineteen
years ago, when the United States levied the trade embargo against
Vietnam, the embargo was honored by the allies of the United
States. 220 Consequently, the embargo effectively inhibited Vietnam
from attaining economic stability because Vietnam could not trade with
the United States nor with any U.S. allies."' Immediately prior to the
lifting of the embargo, however, the United States was the only country
heeding the embargo.' The allies of the United States withdrew their
214. Frank Gaffney, Back on a Slippery Vietnam Slope, WASH. TIMEs, Sept. 14, 1993, at A20.





218. SUTTER, supra note 21, at 8,
219. Vecchi & Scown, supra note 1, at 8.
220. Id. at 22.
221. Id.
222. Id.
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support of the embargo after the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from
Cambodia, and took advantage of the exceptional opportunities for
investment in Vietnam.' In actuality, then, the embargo had little
effect upon Vietnam because the U.S. companies were easily
replaceable.2
D. Business Investments
Advocates of maintaining the trade embargo questioned whether
economic benefits were possible from investment in Vietnam. Claiming
that the Vietnamese market was unstable,' these advocates asserted
that the benefits gained would not outweigh the potential risks. 6 Such
risks included the constantly changing Vietnamese legal system, which
had obvious affects upon applicable investment laws, as well as the
established contracts, which were most often renegotiated. 7  Also,
although protections were provided to foreign investors, these protections
were often intentionally vague.2' For example, the laws regulating
investment in Vietnam were among the most liberal in Asia because the
investor retained all profits.229 However, profits were unascertainable
because the Vietnamese dong, the national currency, is not
convertible.' As a result, investors were forced to buy products to
sell outside of Vietnam, or to leave most of the profits in Vietnam."
Additionally, although one hundred percent of foreign ownership was
permitted, foreign owners had to hire labor through government
agencies." This requirement created an increase in prices for the
investor because the laborers recruited through the government demanded
higher wages. 33 Thus, investment in Vietnam cost more than an initial
glance would suggest.
223. Id.
224. Now Shake Hands With Vietnam, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 17, 1993, at A28. See also U.S.
Chamber Calls For Lifting Embargo on Vietnam For Non-Strategic Activities, Int'l Trade Daily
(BNA) Apr. 26, 1991.
225. AHEARN & SUTTER, supra note 119, at 11.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 12.
229. Id.
230. AHEARN & SUTER, supra note 119, at 12.
231. Id. Investors must be creative by buying Vietnamese products with their unconverted
profits and selling the products outside of Vietnam to gain realized profits. Id. This may be
accomplished by buying raw materials in Vietnam and selling them outside of the country, or
exporting the middle products of production. Investment in Vietnam, 4 FLA. J. INT'L L. 231 (1989).
232. AHEARN & SUTTER, supra note 119, at 12.
233. Id.
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Supporters of the embargo further argued that the conditions of the
country were not conducive to business.' Years of war and
contention among the Vietnamese people left their countryside in a state
of disarray, lending greater skepticism to economic benefits from
investment in Vietnam. 5 Prior to the lifting of the embargo and at
present, the roads, airfields, communications lines, and electricity are all
in poor conditions.3 6  Furthermore, supporters of the embargo
emphasized that the fear of a reoccurring clash between China and
Vietnam were real and valid concerns.237
In response to such arguments, opponents of the embargo reiterated
that Vietnam was making great strides in reforming both its economic
and political situation so as to stimulate its economy.' In particular,
Vietnamese efforts were apparent through the instigation of internal
political change and economic reform, as well as a greater openness to
foreign business and trade.139 Such efforts are discussed below.
1. Political Reform.-Even prior to the embargo's lifting, the
Vietnamese Communist Party-dominated regime was slowly losing
influence in Vietnam.' In the late 1980s, the "Old Guard" generation
communists2" were slowly replaced by a new generation of more
liberal leaders.2 The Vietnamese launched a new economic reform
program, Doi Moi (literally, renovation), to remove certain controls by
state-run enterprises. 3  This movement signaled an effort to
decentralize the economy and place greater power within market
forces.2  On December 18, 1986, Nguyen Van Linh became
Secretary General.u 5  A seventy-one-year-old liberal economic




237. Investment in Vietnam, supra note 231, at 284. 'A clash between Vietnam and China
occurred at sea on March 14, 1988, which leaves the possibility of another clash in the future a valid
concern. Id.
238. AHEARN & SUTTER, supra note 119, at 4.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 6.
241. The phrase "Old Guard" was coined to describe the strong communist leaders that reigned
in Vietnam from the time of the takeover in South Vietnam in 1975 until the mid 1980s. Id. at 5.
242. SUTTER, supra note 21, at 6.
243. AHEARN & SUTTER, supra note 119, at 7.
244. Id.
245. Foreign Investment Climate: Facts and Impressions, E. ASIAN EXEC. REP., June 15, 1989,
at 10 [hereinafter Foreign Investment Climate].
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ties to Ho Chi City."t6 Along with these new liberal leaders came new
reformist ideals.
From 1989 to 1991, the collapse of various communist regimes put
a halt to the political reform in Vietnam. The Vietnamese, in a desperate
effort to maintain and strengthen their communist beliefs, issued a new
constitution in April 1992.' This constitution reaffirmed the political
monopoly of the Communist Party, and thus, no opposition to the
Communist Party rule in Vietnam was condoned."s Nonetheless, the
control of the Communist Party over the Vietnamese economy was
waning. 9 Because of the capitalistic market economy that was being
implemented in an effort to stimulate their present economy, the
Communist party was being shunned." The fall of the Soviet Union
and the withdrawal of its support from Vietnam should have left Vietnam
potentially vulnerable. In addition, the trade embargo imposed by the
United States should have added to this vulnerability. However, Vietnam
still improved the situation of their economy,"' looking to foreign
investment to generate their economy.
2. Economic Reform.-Vietnam's reintegration into the world
economy began in 1986 with the adoption of the "New Thinking"
policy.52 Under this policy, Vietnam created incentives to attract
foreign investment.2 13  To further this economic reform, Vietnam
imposed the Foreign Investment Laws [FIL] on December 29, 1987.'5
The FIL indicated the growing desire of Vietnam to provide a liberal
investment climate for foreign businesses ." Under the FIL, foreign
businesses are allowed to retain one hundred percent of their profits,
maintain control of their companies, and give guarantees against
nationalization. 6  Foreign companies ,are also given a four-year tax
break on top of an import duty holiday.7 Although downfalls to the
246. Id. at 10. Ho Chi Minh is the former stronghold of the strict Communist Party and was
the former capital of North Vietnam before North and South Vietnam became one united country.
Id.
247. AHEARN & SUTrER, supra note 119, at 6.
248. Id. at 5.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Vietnam's goal is to Attract Investment, supra note 14.
252. Ending Vietnam Trade Embargo Held Up by POW/MUI Accounting, Int'l. Trade Daily
(BNA) (Jan. 28, 1992) [hereinafter Ending Vietnam Trade Embargo].
253. Id.
254. Foreign Investment Climate, supra note 245, at 10.
255. Id.
256. Ending Vietnam Trade Embargo, supra note 252.
257. Burkholder, supra note 10, at 10.
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system exist, such as the non-convertible Vietnamese dong, the FIL were
considered to be the most liberal foreign investment laws in all of
Asia.25 While foreign investment has been stimulated by these laws,
the laws are far from perfect and many problems exist that need to be
changed for future investments.259 More important, though, is that
Vietnam is working to bring about these changes, and the transformations
are readily apparent.
3. Opportunities for Foreign Investment. -Fears were expressed by
the supporters of the trade embargo that the physical conditions of
Vietnam were not conducive to business and investment. It is true that
Vietnam is still a backward country. 2 ° As a nation of seventy million
people, Vietnam suffers from poverty due to a lack of resources resulting
from decades of war, isolation, and mismanagement. 261 At an average
of 220 dollars per year, the per capita income of Vietnam is one of the
lowest in the world.2"2 The country itself is in need of repair. Only
ten percent of the roads are paved, one third of the bridges need to be
rebuilt, and brownouts and electrical shortages are common.2 The
attitude on the street is "anything goes if it improves economic conditions
for the people [of Vietnam]." 21 With President Clinton lifting the
block against assistance from IMF, and the added support offered from
France and Japan, Vietnam is now better equipped to improve its
countryside for business. Money for reconstruction of roads, businesses,
and other such necessities is now attainable.
Vietnam has made substantial strides toward full recovery from their
depressed state in recent years. Though still under the yoke of
communism, Vietnam has adopted a free market for foreign investment
in an effort to break out of poverty. 2 5 As a result, foreign investment
in Vietnam in 1991 was 1.4 billion dollars, which exceeded total
investment during the past three years combined.2  Vietnam's
258. SUTTER, supra note 21, at 8.
259. Foreign Investment Climate, supra note 245, at 10. Areas within the FIL that need to be
improved include operations and management of enterprises, repatriation of profits and capital,
taxation, import licensing and customs procedures, foreign exchange and labor relations. Id.
260. Terry McDermott, Vietnam MIA documents Could Influence Embargo Decision, Int'l Trade
Daily (BNA) (Sept. 10, 1993).
261. The Big Buildup Begins, supra note 10, at HI.
262. Id.
263. McDermott, supra note 260, at Al.
264. Foreign Investment Climate, supra note 245, at 10.
265. The Big Buildup Begins, supra note 10, at HI.
266. Ajoy Sen, U.S. Firms Prepare Vietnam Investment - Hanoi, REUTER LIB. REP.
(Singapore), Oct. 29, 1992.
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economy grew at a rate greater than eight percent in 1992, even in light
of the loss of over 1.8 billion dollars in support from the Soviet
Union. 7  Recently, Vietnam has experienced an agricultural
renaissance, achieving the status of the third largest exporter of rice in
the world.2" Consequently, in 1992, Vietnam achieved its first trade
surplus since its "independence." 2 9 Thus, boasting a growth rate of
eight percent per year with a moderate inflation rate and no international
aid, Vietnam has succeeded in virtually stabilizing its economy.270
Furthermore, the possibilities for investments and exploitation of the
natural resources in Vietnam are endless. A significant amount of
natural resources, most specifically petroleum, gas, and mineral deposits,
await exploration in Vietnam." Additionally, Vietnam has the benefit
of an unbeatable strategic location. At the edge of Southeast Asia and
with nearly one half of its border as shoreline, the possibilities for U.S.
companies are endless.' This potential for investment and profit has
attracted foreign business, and the eagerness of Vietnam to open its doors
to foreign investment has allowed Vietnam to reach agreements in over
394 foreign investment projects from 1988 through 1992.273 Nearly
three billion dollars have been committed to Vietnam in foreign
investment."
The economy of Vietnam is presently expanding at a rapid rate, and
although Clinton down-played the economic aspects of the lifting of the
trade embargo, the possibilities now open for U.S. businesses in Vietnam
are extensive. Indeed, because Vietnam possesses great economic
potential, fears are voiced that someday Vietnam may become the new
"Asian Dragon."275 In fact, prospects for a rapid economic
development are actually better in Vietnam than they had been in
267. McDermott, supra note 260, at Al.
268. Charles P. Wallace, Staking a Claim in Vietnam" A Hardy, Young Band of American
Entrepreneurs is Camping Out in Hanoi: They're Betting The U.S. Will Lift its Trade Embargo




271. SUTrrER, supra note 21.
272. Jan Yupcavage, Readjustment Counseling Therapist asserts that in 1985, Vietnams beach
front property sold for $40,000 per acre. Today the same piece of property is worth over a million
dollars. Says Yupcavage, a veteran himself: "We should have been there." Interview with Jan B.
Yupcavage, Readjustment Counseling Therapist of the Vet Center in Harrisburg, PA (October 20,
1993).
273. The Big Buildup Begins, supra note 10, at Hi.
274. AHEARN & SUrTrER, supra note 119, at 8.
275. Burkholder, supra note 10, at 10.
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China.276  Now, U.S. citizens and corporations have general
authorization to engage in direct transactions involving most Vietnamese
assets or entities.277 These wide range of possibilities for U.S. citizens
include, but are not limited to direct investments, travel-related
transactions, asset transfers, brokering transactions, infrastructure
projects, telecommunications, financial services, and consumer
products. 7 Hence, although the economy may not be one hundred
percent stable today, the United States must take the opportunity to invest
now, and the lifting of the embargo affords such an opportunity.
V. Conclusion
As a result of the Vietnamese compliance with the demands set forth
by the United States, the time had come for the United States to lift the
trade embargo it imposed on Vietnam since 1975. At the time of its
lifting, the trade embargo offered inconsequential leverage to force
Vietnamese compliance with U.S. demands, for the United States was the
only country backing this embargo.279 As U.S. companies and
technology were easily replaced, the United States only hindered itself
by maintaining the trade embargo.'
Now, with this open trade with Vietnam, the possibilities for the
United States are endless, and are growing with each new ease on trade.
Most important, the lifting of the embargo will promote cooperation and
familiarity between the two countries, allowing further advances in both
resolving the POW/MIA situation and influencing Vietnam to end its
human rights abuses."'
The purpose of the U.S. participation in the Vietnamese war was to
make South Vietnam safe for capitalism. Thus, no better tribute exists
than to undermine the Vietnam of yesterday by supporting the capitalistic
Vietnamese economy of today.
Beth Castelli
276. Golin, supra note 172, at 63, 65. The Vietnamese people located in the active commercial
sections of Vietnam possess sophisticated business skills. Id. This is a benefit that the Chinese did
not hold. Id. In addition, Vietnam has had the example of China from which to learn. Id.
277. Bravin supra note 176, at S6.
278. CLINTON LiFrs VIETNAM EMBARGO, supra note 165. See also Bravin, supra note 176.
279. Bravin, supra note 176.
280. "Our trade embargo no longer denies Vietnam of goods and services, it only denies
Vietnam of American goods and services. In this day of growing trade deficits and high
unemployment, it makes little sense to keep America out of promising markets." Murkowski Offers
Legislation, supra note 166.
281. Kerry Says Viemam MiA Documents Could lnfluence Embargo Decision, Int'l. Trade Daily
(BNA) (Sept. 10, 1993).
